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Abstract—Biometric-based remote user authentication (BRUA)
is a useful primitive that allows an authorized user to remotely
authenticate to a cloud server using biometrics. However, the
existing BRUA solutions in the client-server setting lack certain
privacy considerations. For example, authorized user’s multiple
sessions should not be linked while his identity remains anony-
mous to cloud server. In this work, we introduce an identity-
concealed and unlinkable biometric-based remote user authen-
tication framework, such that authorized users authenticate to
an honest-but-curious server in an anonymous and unlinkable
manner. In particular, we employ two non-colluding cloud servers
to perform the complex biometrics matching. We formalize two
new security models, including biometrics privacy and user
privacy, for our proposed framework, and prove the security
of the proposed framework in the standard model.
Index Terms—Remote User Authentication, Unlinkability, Bio-
metrics Matching, User Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometric-based user authentication has been widely used in
many real-life applications, such as mobile security, financial
transactions and identification checks [1]. There are some at-
tractive features using biometrics over conventional password.
For example, people need to remember many secure passwords
for many different accounts and update passwords frequently
for security reasons. By contrast, biometrics is permanently
and uniquely associated with an individual, so the individual
can use biometrics for user authentication.
Biometric-based user authentication also leads to some se-
curity and privacy concerns. First, biometrics is not revocable.
If biometrics is compromised, then the user may lose its secu-
rity forever, especially for the single-factor biometric-based
user authentication. Second, authorized users may concern
the privacy of biometrics stored on the authentication server.
Therefore, no biometrics should be stored in plaintext, because
biometrics may contain a wealth of personal information (e.g.,
DNA).
To protect biometrics information, there are mainly three
methods in the literature: non-invertible transform [2], fuzzy
extractors [3] and homomorphic cryptosystem [4]. The non-
invertible transform relies on a static secret key. Essentially, it
is a two-factor (biometrics plus secret key) user authentication
and not scalable for cross-platform setting1, because the secret
1In practice, users may own several devices (e.g., smart-phone, pad and
tablet) and access to the same service provider from various platforms.
key must be available at the time of authentication to transform
the requested biometrics for subsequent user authentication.
The fuzzy extractors based user authentication [5], [6] is a
single-factor user authentication. However, deriving a secret
key from biometrics and other noisy data with high stability
and entropy simultaneously is a non-trivial task.
Using homomorphic encryption [4] to protect biometrics in-
formation is a promising approach when designing biometric-
based user authentication. In particular, the authentication
server in cloud can perform complex mathematical compu-
tations (i.e., biometrics matching) in the encrypted format,
since cloud computing provides ubiquitous, dynamic, scalable
and on-demand services. That is, the cloud-based biometrics
can facilitate efficient biometrics matching for user authen-
tication. In this work, we focus on biometric-based remote
user authentication (BRUA) using homomorphic encryption,
where authorized users wish to remotely authenticate to an
authentication server using encrypted biometrics.
The privacy should be preserved not only for biomet-
rics information, but also for non-biometrics information
(such as identity, behaviour and interaction history). Identity-
concealment is an important privacy property and is man-
dated or recommended by some widely standardized and
deployed cryptographic protocols, such as TLS1.3 and QUIC
[7]. Identity-concealment means that the transcript of pro-
tocol execution should not leak authorized user’s identity
information. Moreover, unlinkability is also desired, such that
multiple sessions of the same authorized user cannot be linked
by the authentication server. The main goal of this work is
to design an identity-concealed and unlinkable BRUA using
homomorphic encryption.
Homomorphic encryption can be used to encrypt identity
information of authorized users during the protocol execution.
However, if the same anonymous user authenticates twice to
an authentication server, then authentication server can still
link the anonymous authenticated user to a specific record
in his database which stores all enrolled user’s records. Note
that such kind of unlinkability between authorized user and
database record is an important feature for sensitive IT infras-
tructure such as personal record management systems [8].
Since biometrics matching of BRUA may handle vari-
ous kinds of distance calculations (e.g., Euclidean distance,
Hamming distance or Chebyshev distance), a suitable ho-
momorphic encryption primitive is critical to the success of
user authentication. Full homomorphic encryption can easily978-1-5386-5790-4/18/$31.00 c©2018 IEEE
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support all aforementioned distance calculations. Specifically,
it enables addition and multiplication simultaneously (on en-
crypted biometrics) when performing biometrics matching.
However, it is not practical in real-world environment (such
as resource-limited devices) due to its computational cost and
system complexity [9], [10].
Instead of full homomorphic encryption, we rely on partial
homomorphic encryption such as Paillier cryptosystem. How-
ever, Paillier cryptosystem is limited to additive operations
over encrypted biometrics. Sometimes the multiplicative oper-
ations are mandatory when Euclidean distance based biomet-
rics matching is applied. Therefore, how to exploit the Paillier
cryptosystem to support complex mathematical operations for
biometrics matching is our first challenge task.
Furthermore, biometrics are typically encrypted under user’s
own public keys and stored in the authentication server. Since
biometrics matching takes different ciphertexts under the same
public key as input, the authentication server must transform
the ciphertexts under different public keys into the ciphertexts
under the same public key. Such transformation is easy when
authorized users are identified. However, this contradicts to the
user privacy we desired. Hence, achieving an anonymous and
unlinkable user authentication is a rather challenging task.
A. This Work
In this work, we introduce the notion of privacy-preserving
biometric-based remote user authentication (PriBioAuth in
short), allowing authorized users to remotely authenticate
to an authentication server using encrypted biometrics. Our
proposed solution employs two (non-colluding) honest-but-
curious cloud servers in the system ([11], [12]), one acts as
authentication server, while the other one acts as a dedicated
computational server which works with authentication server
to assist certain biometrics matching.
As for anonymous and unlinkable PriBioAuth, we first pro-
pose an anonymous key transformation (AKeyTrans) protocol,
such that authentication server performs the key transformation
in an anonymous manner. Meanwhile, inspired by the concept
of oblivious access control [13], [14], we allow authenticated
users to authenticate an authentication server in an oblivious
manner. Based on the anonymous key transformation and
oblivious access control, the proposed PriBioAuth can achieve
the claimed user privacy. Our overall contributions can be
summarized as follows.
• Security and Privacy Guarantee: We provide the formal se-
curity requirements for privacy-preserving biometric-based
remote user authentication protocols. We formalize two for-
mal security models which include various kinds of security
and privacy properties, such as biometrics privacy, oblivi-
ousness of access control, identity-concealment (anonymity)
and unlinkability;
• Practical Construction: In order to enable the authentica-
tion server to perform efficient biometrics matching, we
present a practical solution for biometric-based remote user
authentication using two non-colluding could servers, an
authentication server and a computational server;
• Secure Biometrics Matching: The authentication server in
conjunction with the computational server can perform
various kinds of mathematical computations for biomet-
rics matching. We provide a set of secure multi-party
computation (SMC) sub-protocols to guarantee the success
of biometric-based remote user authentication, including
less than, equivalent testing and multiplicative computation
protocols. In particular, no user interaction is required for
biometrics matching;
• Scalability of Use: It is easy to employ our solution in
a cross-platform setting. Because the proposed PriBioAuth
solution is a single-factor user authentication without gen-
erating extra secret keys at the time of authentication.
B. Related Work
Biometric-based User Authentication/Identification. Privacy-
preserving was the main focus of designing biometric-based
user authentication and identification in the literature [15],
[16], [17], [18], [19], but the definition on privacy are various.
For example, some works [15], [16] assume that biometrics
template is a public information (e.g., fingerprint and face).
Specifically, they assume an authentication server (or service
provider) and a non-colluding database in the system. In
particular, the plain biometrics template is stored in database,
and the privacy concern is about the relationship between
biometrics template and identity (or pseudonym). However,
we assume biometrics is a secret information in this work.
Homomorphic encryption (see below) is a suitable cryp-
tographic tool to protect biometrics instead of non-invertible
transform and fuzzy extractors. In particular, it supports the se-
cure multi-party computations (SMC) on encrypted biometrics
for biometrics matching. Note that some well-known works
[20], [17], [18], [19] have used the Paillier cryptosystem as
encryption primitive to protect user’s biometrics. For example,
Huang et al. [19] proposed a flexible biometric-based iden-
tification framework. They used the garbled circuit [21] to
efficiently and obliviously perform biometrics matching and
retrieve the outcome of results. However, the authentication
server should interact with authorized user to finalize the
biometrics matching.
Bringer et al. [15] proposed a biometric-based user authen-
tication protocol using Goldwasser-Micali (GM) cryptosystem
[22]. Note that the GM cryptosystem takes the binary string
(such as Iris [23]) as input. To allow Paillier cryptosystem
process the binary input, Schoenmakers and Tuyls [24] pro-
posed a generic framework, such that the underlying Paillier
cryptosystem [25] can process binary string for biometrics
matching. That is, the Paillier crytosystem can handle bits
strings using their proposed binary conversion.
Homomorphic Encryption. Homomorphic encryption (HE) is
a well-known approach for privacy-preserving secure multi-
party computation. There are mainly two types of HE system
in the literature: one is full FE, and the other is partial HE.
The latter type consists of additive homomorphic encryption
and multiplicative homomorphic encryption separately, while
the former type can support both addition and multiplication
over ciphertext simultaneously. We omit the somewhat HE for
simplicity.
Gentry [4] proposed the first full HE scheme based on
lattice-based cryptography. While a number of following
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works (e.g., [26], [9], [10]) have been proposed afterwards,
it is still not practical to implement in real-life applications.
The partial homomorphic encryption is often considered as a
suitable alternative in practice. For example, Paillier cryptosys-
tem [25] is supporting addition over ciphertext, while ElGamal
cryotosystem [27] is supporting multiplication over ciphertext.
Based on the practical Paillier cryptosystem, Peter et al.
[11] proposed an efficient outsourcing SMC protocol which is
proven to be secure in honest-but-curious model. In particular,
their proposed method can be used for privacy-preserving face
authentication. Later on, Liu et al. [12] proposed an efficient
outsourcing toolkits for SMC protocols. To support various
computations (e.g., multiplication, less than and division) in
cloud, Liu et al. proposed a new cryptographic primitive:
distributed two trapdoors public key cryptosystem (DT-PKC)
(which is an extension from [28]).
This work aims to exploit some inherent features of DT-
PKC for remote user authentication. In particular, we discover
that such kind of homomorphic cryptosystems [28], [11],
[12] have desired “key privacy” [29] property, which will be
formally defined and analyzed in III-C.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In
the next Section, we formalize the system model and the
threat models (namely, biometrics privacy and user privacy).
In Section 3, we describe some preliminaries which will be
used in our proposed constructions, and present the proposed
authentication framework. We then present our security anal-
ysis and performance analysis in Section 4 and 5 respectively.
The paper is concluded in Section 6.
II. SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present the corresponding models for
privacy-preserving biometric-based remote user authentication
(PriBioAuth) protocols. As mentioned in the introduction, a
PriBioAuth should achieve several security and privacy goals:







/ski: User i’s public/secret key
IDi: Identity of user i
dist(x, y): Distance between vector x and vector y
t ∈ R+: Threshold value (positive real number)
B: Plain biometrics
C: Reference biometrics
N: Dimension of biometrics
Z: Finite field
n: Number of users
k: Number of secret credentials
[[x]] (i.e., [[x]]pk): Encryption on x under the public key pk
(N, g): Public paramaters in DT-PKC
S: Splitting technique in DT-PKC
Enc: Encryption algorithm in DT-PKC
Dec: Decryption algorithm in DT-PKC
PD(1/2): Partial decryption algorithm in DT-PKC
A. System Model
We present a biometric-based remote user authentication
system involving three types of entities: key generation center
(KGC), requested user (RU) and authentication server CP
(which may consist of an additional computational cloud
server (CSP)). We then define a biometric-based remote user
authentication which consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: The KGC takes the security parameter O as in-
put, outputs a master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk). In
addition, KGC outputs a set of credentials {msk(i)}k, and
distributes them to respective CP and CSPi through a secure
channel.
• KeyGen. User takes master public key mpk as input, outputs
a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
• Registration. User enrolls his/her identity ID along with a
reference biometrics C to CP2. There may exist an interac-
tive algorithm between the CP and a CSPi in cloud. User
becomes a RU after registration.
• Authentication. RU sends his/her identity ID and a candi-
date biometrics C′ to the cloud server CP, then CP accept it
if and only if dist(C′, C) ≤ t. There may exist an interactive
algorithm between CP and CSPi in cloud.
Remark. Note that the reference and candidate biometrics
are in encrypted format, more specifically, they are encrypted
under user’s own public key.
B. Threat Model
1) Biometrics Privacy: Informally, an adversary attempts to
learn user’s plain biometrics. Below is the biometrics privacy
game between an adversary A and a simulator S as follows.
• Setup: S first generates public/secret key pairs (pki, ski)
(i ∈ [1, n]) for n users and m servers respectively in the
system. In addition, S generates a set of secret credentials
{sk(j)}kj=1 for k (k ≤ m) servers. S also generates user’s
plain biometrics {Bi} and their corresponding reference
biometrics {Ci}, and returns all reference biometrics to A.
S eventually tosses a random coin b which will be used later
in the game.
• Training: A can make the following queries in arbitrary
sequence to S.
– Send: IfA issues a send query in the form of (ID, i,msg)
(resp. (CP, i,msg)) to simulate a network message for the
i-th session of user ID (resp. server CP), then S would




upon receiving message msg, and return to A the re-
sponse that ΠiID (Π
i
CP) would generate. If A issues a Send
query in the form of (ID′, ‘start′) (resp. (CP′, ‘start′)),
then S creates a new instance oracle ΠiID′ (resp. Π
i
CP′)
and returns to A the first protocol message.
– Secret Key Reveal: If A issues a Secret Key Reveal
(or corrupt, for short) query to user i, then S returns user
i’s secret key ski to A. Note that A is allowed to issue
at most n-1 Secret Key Reveal queries to S. We denote
the honest (i.e., uncorrupted) user set as U ′.
– Secret Credential Reveal: IfA issues a credential reveal
query to the CP, then S returns CP’s secret credential
sk(j) to A.
2Note that the binding between user identity ID and his/her public key pk
is authenticated by a certificate cert issued by KGC.
3We denote the i-th session established by user ID as instance oracle ΠiID.
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• Challenge: A randomly chooses two challenge biometrics
(B0,B1)(/∈ {Bi}) of a challenge user IDi ∈ U
′, and sends
the challenge biometrics to S. S simulates the reference
biometrics of user Ui by either C
∗
b = F(pki,B0) if b = 0 or
C∗b = F(pki,B1) if b = 1.
Note that A is allowed to reveal k-1 secret credentials (by
corrupting servers), and F denotes a probabilistic algorithm.
Finally, A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then S
outputs 1; otherwise, S outputs 0. We define the advantage
of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvA(O, k) = |Pr[S → 1]− 1/2|.
Definition 2.1: We say that a PriBioAuth scheme has
biometrics privacy if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) A, AdvA(O, k) is a negligible function of the security
parameter O.
2) User Privacy: Informally, an adversary attempts to iden-
tify the users involved in a biometric-based remote user au-
thentication protocol. Below is the user privacy game between
an adversary A and a simulator S as follows.
• Setup: S first generates public/secret key pairs (pki, ski)
(i ∈ [1, n]) for n users and m servers respectively in the
system. In addition, S generates a set of secret credentials
{sk(j)}kj=1 for k (k ≤ m) servers. S also generates user’s
plain biometrics {Bi} and their corresponding reference bio-
metrics {Ci}, and returns all public information (including
{Ci}) to A. S eventually tosses a random coin b which will
be used later in the game.
• Training: A is allowed to issue Send query, at most n-
2 Secret Key Reveal and k-1 Secret Credential Reveal
queries to S. We denote the honest (i.e., uncorrupted) user
set as U ′.
• Challenge: A randomly selects two users IDi, IDj ∈ U
′
as challenge candidates, then S removes them from U ′ and
simulates ID∗b to A by either ID
∗
b = IDi if b = 0 or ID
∗
b =
Uj if b = 1.
A ⇔ ID∗b =
{
IDi b = 0
IDj b = 1
Let A interact with ID∗b . Finally, A outputs b
′ as its guess
for b. If b′ = b, then S outputs 1; otherwise, S outputs 0.
We define the advantage of an adversary A in the above
game as
AdvA(O, k) = |Pr[S → 1]− 1/2|.
Definition 2.2: We say that a PriBioAuth scheme has user
privacy if for any PPT A, AdvA(O, k) is a negligible function
of the security parameter O.
Remark. We assume a passive adversary, who is able to
monitor or eavesdropping (except modifying or tampering)
all transcripts send on the network. We consider an honest-
but-curious model in this work, which is formalized by some
existing works (e.g., [20], [19], [11]). Specifically, the request
user and the authentication server are assumed to execute the
protocol as specified, just try to learn additional information




We briefly present some secure computation protocols de-
scribed in [12], which will be used in our proposed user
authentication framework. Note that we just mention their
functionality for simplicity.
• Secure Less Than Protocol (SLT). We assume two encrypted
integers [[x]] and [[y]], the SLT protocol will provide an
encrypted results [[u]], which can be used to determine the
relationship between the plaintexts of two encrypted integers
(i.e., x > y or x ≤ y). As a result, u = 0 indicates x > y,
and u = 1 indicates x ≤ y.
• Secure Equivalent Testing Protocol (SEQ). Given two en-
crypted integers [[x]] and [[y]], SEQ will provide the encrypted
results [[f ]] to determine whether the plaintext of the two
encrypted integers are equivalent (i.e., x
?
= y). As a result,
f = 1 indicates x = y, and f = 0 indicates x 6= y.
• Secure Multiplicative Computation Protocol (SMT). Given
two encrypted integers [[x]] and [[y]] as input, the SMT can
generate the result [[x · y]] by using two non-colluding cloud
servers CP and CSP.
B. Secure Euclidean Distance Computation Protocol (SEDC)
We present the proposed secure Euclidean distance compu-
tation protocol. We use Fingerprints as the candidate of bio-
metrics, which is represented by FingerCode. The FingerCode
[30] is typically a N-dimensional (e.g., N=640) feature vector,
and each entry is a 8-bit integer. The Euclidean distance d =
dist(B,B′) between reference biometrics B = (v1, · · · , vN)
and candidate biometrics B′ = (v′1, · · · , v
′
N
) is calculated as.




= (v1 − v
′
1)
2 + (v2 − v2)















Note that the CP and CSP perform the biometrics matching






j=1 as shown in Figure 1.
CP [msk(1)] CSP [msk(2)]











[[wj]] = [[vj − v
′
j ]][[r(j,1)]]
[[w′j]] = [[vj − v
′
j ]][[r(j,2)]]








































d = H · S1 · S2 · S3
Fig. 1. Secure Euclidean Distance Computation Protocol (SEDC).
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Correctness of d. CP performs the following calculation, and
h = m ·m′ = ΣNj=1[(vj − v
′
j) · r(j,1)][(vj − v
′
j) · r(j,2)].
d = H · S1 · S2 · S3
= [[ΣNj=1[(vj − v
′
j) · r(j,1)][(vj − v
′
j) · r(j,2)]
−ΣNj=1[r(j,1) · (vj − v
′
j) + r(j,2) · (vj − v
′
j)






C. Another look of DT-PKC
The underlying DT-PKC is the main building block of
the proposed PriBioAuth framework. We discover that the
DT-PKC has an inherent feature: “key privacy”, which is
introduced by Bellare et al. [29]. It means that an adversary
in possession of a ciphertext cannot tell which specific key,
out of a set of known public keys, is the one under which the
ciphtertext was created. In particular, they formalized a new
model: “indistinguishability of keys” (IK). We formally prove
the DT-PKC cryptosystem is secure in the IK-CPA model, in
addition to its IND-CPA security [12]. We believe that both
BCP [28] and its variant DT-PKC cryptosystem have such
implicit property.
1) Security model of key privacy:
Definition 3.1: The IK-CPA experiment between an adver-
sary A and a simulator S is defined below [29].
Experiment ExpIK-CPAPE (O)
(pk0, sk0), (pk1, sk1)← KeyGen(1
O)
(msg∗, st)← A(find, pk0, pk1)
C∗ ← Encpkb(msg
∗)
b′ = A(guess, st, C∗)
If b′ = b, return 1; else, return 0.
Note that st denotes some state information. We define the
advantage of the adversary as
AdvIK-CPAA (O) = |Pr[S → 1]− 1/2|. (1)
Definition 3.2: An encryption scheme
(PE,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) is said to be IK-CPA secure if
AdvIK-CPAA (O) is negligible in O for any PPT adversary A.
2) Security of DT-PKC: We prove the DT-PKC is IK-CPA
secure if the underlying DDH assumption holds in group Z∗N2
[28]. In particular, we assume the factorization of the modulus
N is hard, or the DDH assumption over Z∗
N2
turns out to be
easy (refer to Theorem 4 in [28] for detailed relations).
Theorem 3.3: The DT-PKC achieves IK-CPA security if the
DDH assumption holds in Z∗N2 .
The detailed proof is deferred to the full version of this work
due to page limitation.
D. Proposed Framework
We now present our privacy-preserving biometric-based
remote user authentication (PriBioAuth) framework. KGC first
generates two secret credentials and distributes them to CP
and CSP respectively. A RU encrypts ID and biometrics
using his/her own public key, and sends them to CP for
Registration. As for Authentication, RU sends encrypted
ID and candidate biometrics to CP, while CP accept RU iff
the candidate biometrics is “close enough” to RU’s reference
biometrics. In particular, we assume that CP stores a set of
encrypted identities and biometrics information after Regis-
tration.
Problem Statement. In the Authentication stage, the candi-
date biometrics should be compared with reference biometrics
in database. The obvious problem is that a set of enrolled
biometrics are not under same public key, while the underlying
DT-PKC requires homomorphic operations under the same
public key. Another problem is that CP should perform biomet-
rics matching between one record in database and candidate
identity/biometrics. In other words, CP can explicitly link the
anonymous authenticated RU to a specific record in database.
High-level Description. To address the above problems, we
first need an additional procedure to fix these “various”
encrypted data prior to the actual biometrics matching between
CP and CSP. Specifically, CP partially decrypts reference data
using distributed secret credential, and sends them to CSP for
full decryption on reference data. Then CSP randomly chooses
a “dummy” public key pk∗ such that pk∗ 6= {pki, pkCP}, and
re-encrypts data using pk∗4.
After anonymous key transformation (AKeyTrans) during
Authentication, CP and CSP run the corresponding SLT and
SEQ protocols on candidate identity and reference identity.
Consequently, CP and CSP run the SEDC and SLT protocols
to obtain the relationship between candidate biometrics and
reference biometrics. If both SEQ protocol and SLT protocol
output “[[1]]∗” (encryption under public key pk
∗), then CP
authenticates a requested user RU.
To achieve the claimed user privacy, CP will go through
all records in database when authenticating a RU. More
precisely, CP obtains a set of individual encrypted results
{[[0]]∗, [[1]]∗, · · · , [[0]]∗} after going through the entire database;
then CP can obtain the encrypted final results [[1]]∗(= [[0]]∗ ·
[[1]]∗ · · · [[0]]∗). After interacting with CSP, CP outputs the plain
authentication results “1” iff the candidate identity/biometrics
is matching one of records in database. We present the detailed
PriBioAuth framework below.
• Setup: KGC takes the security parameter as input, outputs
master public/secret key pair (mpk, msk). In addition, KGC
outputs two secret credentials (msk(1), msk(2)) ← S(msk),
and distributes them to CP and CSP respectively.
• KeyGen: User takes master public key mpk as input, outputs
a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
• Registration: User randomly chooses a nonce r first;
then computes reference identity [[ID]], biometrics [[B]] (i.e.,
Encpk(B)), and two encrypted nonces [[r]], [[r]]∗ (the second
one is using public key pk∗). Eventually, user sends his/her
identity ID and all encrypted values to CP. In particular, CP
and CSP perform the AKeyTrans protocol as described in
Fig. 2.
Note that B = (v1, · · · , vN) = {vj}
N
j=1, and CP
holds a set of transformed reference identity/biometrics
{(IDi, [[IDi]]∗, [[Bi]]∗)} under public key pk
∗.
4The secret key sk∗ is unknown to all RU, CP and CSP, while pk∗ is










CT = ([[m1]], {[[m(j,2)]]})
CT
(1)


































[[ID]]∗ ← [[m1]]∗ · [[r]]
(N−r1)
∗
{[[vj ]]∗ ← [[m(j,2)]]∗ · [[r]]
(N−r(j,2))
∗ }
Fig. 2. AKeyTrans Protocol under Public Key pk∗.
• Authentication: RU generates the candidate request us-
ing the same method described above, and sends mes-
sage ([[ID]], [[B′]], [[rRU]], [[rRU]]∗) as authentication Request
to CP. Then CP and CSP take one record in database
([[IDi]]∗, [[Bi]]∗) as reference input, and perform user authen-
tication as specified in Fig. 3. Eventually, CP accept RU if
the final results is “1”; otherwise, CP outputs “⊥”.
Remark 1. In order to prevent replay attacks, we can use
the time-stamp since the proposed framework requires no user
interaction. More specifically, RU generates an encrypted time-
stamp [[TS′]]∗ and sends it to CP. The rest procedure will
follow the protocol specification in Fig. 3. Another counter-
measure is to let CP to store all seen requested values (in a
certain time-window encoded in an additional nonce value)
from RU in order to detect and reject repeated requests with
the same value and nonce.
Remark 2. We can use the packing technique [17], [19] to
save both computation and bandwidth between RU and CP.
We assume RU sends encrypted biometrics [[B]] = {[[vj+K]]}
to CP (K denote the number of single entry which is “packed”
into one ciphertext). According to packing implementation in
[17], [19], we know that K = 20 if a 1024-bit modulus is used
in Paillier cryptosystem. Given the “packed” ciphertext, CP
and CSP run the SEDC protocol afterwards.
However, there may exist a serious problem. If one bit of
candidate “packed” biometrics does not match the reference
“packed” biometrics, then the result of Euclidean distance may
easily beyond threshold t. To let CP and CSP perform SEDC
protocol successfully, we can use secure multi-bit extraction
(MBE) protocol and secure ciphertext partition (SCP) protocol
in [31] to extract the correct (sliced) ciphertext with respect
to single integer.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 4.1: The proposed PriBioAuth framework has
biometrics privacy if the underlying DT-PKC is semantically
(IND-CPA) secure.
The proof of biometrics privacy is obvious, because if an
attacker can break the biometrics privacy security, then we
can construct an efficient algorithm to break the IND-CPA
security of underlying DT-PKC.
Theorem 4.2: The proposed PriBioAuth framework has user
privacy if the underlying DT-PKC is IK-CPA secure.
Proof 1: We define a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, · · · , 3
and let AdvPriBioAuthi denote the advantage of the adversary in
game Gi.
• G0 This is the original game for user privacy.
• G1 This game is identical to game G0 except that at the
challenge stage, we replace the component [[IDi]] of first
message by [[IDi]]R, where R is a random public key. Below
we show the difference between G0 and G1 is negligible
under the assumption that the DT-PKC is IK-CPA secure.
Let S denote an attacker against DT-PKC, who is given
challenge public keys (pk0, pk1), aims to break the IK-CPA
security of DT-PKC. S simulates the game for A as follows.
– Setup: S first generates public/secret key pair (pkj , skj)
for n-1 users and two servers (CP and CSP). In addition,
S generates a public/secret key pair (pk∗, sk∗) for anony-
mous key-transformation. S also honestly generates two
secret credentials sk(1), sk(2) for CP and CSP. S gener-
ates user’s plain biometrics {Bj} and their corresponding
reference biometrics {[[Bj]]pkj}. S sets public key of user
i (i 6= j) as pk0. It is obvious that S can answer all the
queries made by A except user i. Below we mainly focus
on the simulation of user i.
– Training: S answers A’s queries as follows.
∗ If A issues a send query in the form of (ID′, ‘start′)
to S, then S will return ([[ID′]]pk′ , [[B
′]]pk′) to A. Note
that ID′ and B′(/∈ {Bi}) are encrypted using ID
′.
If A issues a send query in the form of (CSP, i,msg)
to S, then S decrypts msg (using secret credential)
and returns the ciphertext which is encrypted using the
public key pk∗. msg denotes the partially decrypted
randomized ciphertext. In particular, if the randomized
ciphertext denote as [[z + r]]pk∗ , where r is randomly
chosen by A, then S obtains the message z + r and
returns the ciphertext which is encrypted using pkCP.
Note that S uses the same method to simulate trans-
mitted message if A issues a send query in the form
of (CP, i,msg). Also note that the send query is
mainly used to simulate the transmitted messages of
all corresponding subprotocols (such as SEQ, SEDC,
SLT, etc) between CP and CSP.
∗ If A issues secret key reveal query to user i, then S
abort. Recall that A has the following restrictions:
1) A can corrupt at most n-2 users; 2) A can corrupt
(secret credential reveal) either CP or CSP; 3) A cannot
corrupt key pair (pk∗, sk∗).
– Challenge: S first follows the user privacy game to select
IDb. If the challenge user IDb is not user i, then abort;
otherwise, S sets the challenge message in its IK-CPA
game as m = IDi and receives a challenge ciphertext
C∗ from its own challenger. Eventually, S generates








← Z Secret Crendential : msk(1) Secret Credential : msk(2)
Candidate : ([[ID]], [[B′]]) References : {(IDi, [[IDi]]∗, [[Bi]]∗)}
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←−−−−− m← DecskCP (CT )
CT
←−−−−−−−−−−−− CT ← EncpkCP (m)
accept RU iff z = 1
Fig. 3. Authentication with Corresponding Sub-computational Protocols.
randomness ri is chosen by S.) and sends it to A as the
transmitted message from RU to CP.
If the public key used to generate C∗ is pk0, then the
simulation is consistent with G0; otherwise, the simulation
is consistent with G1. Therefore, if the advantage of A is
significantly different in G0 and G1, S can break the IK-






∣ ≤ n · AdvIK-CPAS (O). (2)
• G2 This game is identical to game G0 except that at the
challenge stage, we replace the component [[Bi]] of first
message by [[Bi]]R, where R is a random public key. By






∣ ≤ n · AdvIK-CPAS (O). (3)
We assume that there is a sequence of sub-games G2,i
(1 ≤ i ≤ N) in game G2. The actual number of sub-games
depends on both the dimensional of biometrics Bi and if the
packing technique is used or not.
• G3 This game is identical to game G0 except that at the
challenge stage, we replace the component [[ri]] of first
message by [[ri]]R, where R is a random public key. By






∣ ≤ n · AdvIK-CPAS (O). (4)
By combing the above results together, we have.




This experiment was run on virtual machines (3.6 GHz
single-core processor and 6 GB RAM memory). The ex-
periment assumes that user’s biometric information has been
converted into the format needed, because the representation
(depends on the feature extraction algorithms) of biometric
data may vary. The running time and communication cost
mainly depend on the bit length of N . Two extra factors are
also needed to be considered, one is the vector dimension N,
and the other one is the number of users n when evaluating
the proposed PriBioAuth framework. The comprehensive per-
formance analysis is presented below.
1) SEDC sub-protocol. The SEDC sub-protocol is essential
for the efficiency of our proposed framework. We analyze
its performance at Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b respectively, and we
observe that both the running time (see left coordinate) and
communication cost (see right coordinate) increase with bit
length N and vector dimension N. In particular, the vector
dimension of biometrics here ranges from 100 to 500, and
each vector is a 8-bit integer. Note that the efficiency of
SEDC sub-protocol will grow linearly with the dimension
of extracted feature vectors N.
2) PriBioAuth framework. From Fig. 4c to Fig. 4e, we observe
that the running time and communication cost will increase
with vector dimension N, number of users n (10-50) and bit
length N . We also observe that the PriBioAuth framework
is linear with these factors. In particular, CP and CSP in
Authentication stage perform more cryptographic opera-
tions than Registration stage, because the corresponding
computational sub-protocols are required.
3) Time-Complexity (see Table II). The time-complexity re-
lies on the size of public parameter N , the number of
records in database n, the number of addition, multiplica-
tion and exponentiation operations. Let O(N) be a linear
time algorithm, O(Nα) denotes a polynomial time algo-
rithm for constant α and sets α = 3 w.r.t. exponentiation.
Note that the Retrieval means that CP retrieves the outcome
of authentication from CSP. We stress that the action of
RU (e.g., a resource-limited device without storing any
secret keys) is just Pallier encryption on ID and plain
biometrics, while CP and CSP in cloud collaboratively run
the corresponding sub-protocols without interacting with
RU.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a framework of privacy-
preserving biometric-based remote user authentication using
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Fig. 4. Evaluation findings of PriBioAuth and its corresponding sub-protocols.
TABLE II
THE COMPLEXITY COST OF PRIBIOAUTH.
Stages PriBioAuth
Reg O(N3) on RU
AKeyTrans O(N3) on CP and CSP
SEQ n · O(N3) on CP and CSP
SEDC n · O(N3) on CP and CSP
SLT n · O(N3) on CP and CSP
SMT n · O(N3) on CP and CSP
Retrieval O(N3) on CP and CSP
homomorphic encryption. We also defined the new formal
security models for biometrics privacy and user privacy, and
proved the security of the proposed framework in the standard
model. We leave the construction of biometric-based remote
user authentication without going through the whole database
as our future work, such that the time-complexity is not linear
in the number of enrolled users.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The work is supported by the Singapore National Re-
search Foundation under NCR Award Number NRF2014NCR-
NCR001-012. It is also supported by AXA Research Fund.
REFERENCES
[1] A. K. Jain, K. Nandakumar, and A. Ross, “50 years of biomet-
ric research: Accomplishments, challenges, and opportunities,” Pattern
Recognition Letters, vol. 79, pp. 80–105, 2016.
[2] A. K. Jain, K. Nandakumar, and A. Nagar, “Biometric template security,”
EURASIP Journal on advances in signal processing, vol. 2008, p. 113,
2008.
[3] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors: How to generate
strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,” in EUROCRYPT,
2004, pp. 523–540.
[4] C. Gentry, “Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices,” in
STOC, 2009, pp. 169–169.
[5] X. Boyen, “Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors,” in ACM CCS,
2004, pp. 82–91.
[6] N. Li, F. Guo, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, and S. Nepal, “Fuzzy extractors for
biometric identification,” in ICDCS, 2017, pp. 667–677.
[7] Y. Zhao, “Identity-concealed authenticated encryption and key ex-
change,” in ACM CCS, 2016, pp. 1464–1479.
[8] M. Maffei, G. Malavolta, M. Reinert, and D. Schröder, “Privacy and
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